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"CHANNELING THOUGHT": THE LEGACY OF LEGAL
FICTIONS FROM 1823
Jen Camden- & Kathryn E. Fort***
Introduction
When... the conquered inhabitants can be... safely governed as
a distinctpeople, public opinion, which not even the conqueror can
disregard, imposes these restraints upon him; and he cannot
neglect them without injury to his fame, and hazard to his power.'
When Cooper was finished, New Yorkers-and all the world, for
that matter-could see the state, in all its versatile expanse, as it
had never been seen before.2
James Fenimore Cooper's novel The Pioneers3 and Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion Johnson v. M'Intosh4 were published in the same year,
1823. Both take part in the contemporary debate over indigenous land rights
from a similar authorial viewpoint-that of white male landowners.
Marshall's opinion, however, has the force of law behind it, while Cooper's
novel is merely a work of popular literature. That said, Johnson was certainly
read by far fewer people than The Pioneers.5 While Marshall's opinion became
© 2009 Jen Camden & Kathryn E. Fort
* Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 877 (1986) ("[I]f
accepted, a legal fiction channels thought.").
** Assistant Professor of English, University of Indianapolis. I would like to thank my
wonderful colleagues and my family, especially Eric Landen, for their support, advice, and
encouragement.
*** Adjunct Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Staff Attorney,
Indigenous Law and Policy Center. This paper was prepared for the 4th Annual Indigenous Law
Conference, "American Indian Law and Literature," at Michigan State University College of
Law (October 19-20,2007). Thank you to Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel, Ross and
David Fort, and Diane and Ken Henningfeld.
1. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823).
2. Thomas F. O'Donnell, Literary History of New York, 1650-1958, in UPSTATE
LITERATURE: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF THOMAS F. O'DONNELL 3, 7 (Frank Bergmann ed., 1985).
3. JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE PIONEERS (Donald Ringe ed., Penguin 1988) (1823).
4. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
5. COOPER, supra note 3, at vii ("Published in 1823, the book was an immediate success
and established him in a career as a professional novelist.").
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the foundation for decisions regarding tribal land rights, Cooper's novel served
as the equal cultural touchpoint for the reasoning behind Johnson. Cooper's
work, understood as both fiction and memoir,6 gives life to the same legal
fictions used by Justice Marshall to dispossess all tribes of title to their land.
In bringing together The Pioneers and Johnson, this article participates in
a larger tradition of the study of law and literature. From James Boyd White7
to Robert Cover' and Robin West,9 scholars have been interested in the
relationship between these fields, both of which rely on storytelling and locate
power in the written word. Early scholarship focused on critical reading of
text by applying literary theory to the law.'" Scholars used the tools of literary
criticism to understand the law, and particularly legal opinions, as a narrative.1 '
In doing so, critics were able to talk about whose stories were being told by
judges and whose were not. The combination of critical race theory and the
study of law and literature provided scholars a way of demonstrating that
though one view of a story or history had the force of law, this dominant
narrative was created, at least in part, through the suppression of alternative
minority narratives. 2
6. See, e.g., ALAN TAYLOR, WILLIAM COOPER'S TOWN: POWER AND PERSUASION ON THE
FRONTIER OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 53 (1995) ("One of the newcomers who
preceded Cooper's visit was a squatter named David Shipman, who later served as a model for
the hunter Natty Bumppo in The Pioneers.").
7. JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW AND
POLITICS (1994); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law andReading
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415 (1982) [hereinafter White, Law as Language]. For a discussion
of White's work, see Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
1, 54-59 (1989) and Robin West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L.J. 1187 (1996) [hereinafter
West, Literary Lawyer].
8. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
9. ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993); West, Literary Lawyer, supra
note 7; Robin West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-as-
Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1986) [hereinafter West, Adjudication Is Not
Interpretation].
10. See, e.g., White, Law as Language, supra note 7.
11. Bruce Duthu, Incorporative Discourse in Federal Indian Law: Negotiating Tribal
Sovereignty Through the Lens of Native American Literature, 13 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 141, 148
(2000).
12. Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2280, 2296 (1989) ("No version of the American story gives full voice to Native Americans.
The American legal order debars the autonomy of tribes and the possibility of dialogue with
them as independent centers of sovereignty."); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and
Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1929 (1991).
[Vol. 33
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The tensions between fiction and history or between minority and majority
narratives are particularly compelling in the study of legal fictions. 3 Legal
fictions, or statements understood by lawyers and judges to be false,14 but that
lead to a consistent holding in the law, are rarely questioned as anything other
than a tool the law uses to ensure a fair or consistent conclusion. 5 Although
the parties to a given case may accept a legal fiction for the sake of reaching
a consistent conclusion, the use of legal fictions to set precedent raises an
interesting question: Do legal fictions remain fictions over time, or do they
acquire the patina of fact? Specifically, are legal fictions written in 1823, such
as those used in Johnson, still considered fictions, or have they become
historical fact? Moreover, while legal fictions are expected in the law, they
also exist in literature-as fiction, of course. What happens, however, when
a work of literature is also a thinly veiled memoir? Does the reading audience
understand the text as fiction or history? In other words, both legal fictions
and fiction can take on the authority of history.
This article looks at two works as examples of legal fictions that are both
self- and mutually reinforcing. 6 The first, Johnson, creates the legal fiction
of discovery and conquest to ensure a smooth chain of title-and permanently
dispossess tribes of full title to their land in Anglo-American courts. 7 The
second, The Pioneers, popularized the fictions of the "vanishing Indian" and
open wilderness to the west, i" reinforcing Justice Marshall's similar
language. 9 The Pioneers is an apt literary comparison, not only because the
13. Whether the study of legal fictions belongs in the study of law and literature may be
questioned, but as Professor Soifer points out, "[Tihey pose special challenges for the best work
on law and literature." Soifer, supra note *, at 873.
14. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 7 (1967).
15. Of course, these are not always the same thing.
16. From the perspective of law and literature, only two articles have compared these two
pieces: Susan Scheckel, "In the Land of His Fathers": Cooper, Land Rights, and the
Legitimation of American National Identity, in JAMES FENIMORE COOPER: NEW HISTORICAL
AND LITERARY CONTEXTS 125 (W.M. Verhoeven ed., 1993) and Eric Cheyfitz, Savage Law:
The Plot Against American Indians in Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh and The
Pioneers, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM 109 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease
eds., 1993).
17. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) ("All our institutions
recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and
recognize the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an
absolute and complete title in the Indians.").
18. West, at least, of where most of Cooper's readers were. See, e.g., HENRYNASHSMITH,
VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH (1950).
19. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590-91 ("The game fled into thicker and more unbroken
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case and the book were released in the same year, but also because of the
general perception of The Pioneers as a fictional work grounded in history:
most readers understood the novel as a fictionalization of James Fenimore
Cooper's childhood in upstate New York. The novel's fictional setting of
Templeton and Cooper's portrait of Judge Marmaduke Temple are based on
Cooper's father, Judge William Cooper, and hometown, Cooperstown. The
Pioneers, then, was particularly positioned to do the "cultural work" 20 needed
to reinforce the legitimacy of Justice Marshall's decision. In this article, we
build and expand on the work of Susan Scheckel and Eric Cheyfitz21 to argue
that the legal fictions found in Marshall's opinion and Cooper's novel are
mutually reinforcing and equally damaging to indigenous rights. Moreover, we
suggest that Cooper's novel and Marshall's opinion each utilize narrative as
a palliative in their attempt to gloss over past wrongs and create the legal
fictions necessary to justify the tenancy of the American landscape by white
settlers at the expense of Native land rights.
Part I of this article gives a brief history of the study of law and literature,
with particular attention to the study of legal fictions as a key approach to
federal Indian law. Parts 2 and 3 discuss Johnson v. M'Intosh, focusing
primarily on its use of legal fictions and the continued relevance of this case
today, both within and outside of federal Indian law. Part 4 extends our
discussion of legal fictions to The Pioneers, James Fenimore Cooper, and his
father, William Cooper. Finally, Part 5 argues that the mutually reinforcing
themes in Johnson and The Pioneers remain dangerous to this day.
. Law, Literature, Legal Fictions, and Federal Indian Law
The study of law and literature seems inevitable, though it is still a small
area compared to other fields of jurisprudence.22 Both law and literature
require that information is related in an order that is pleasing to their somewhat
distinct audiences. Lawyers and judges prefer continuity with tradition; for
example, judges tend to follow a specific format for a published opinion.23 A
forests, and the Indians followed. The soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being
no longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants .... ").
20. JANE TOMPKINS, SENSATIONAL DESIGNS: THE CULTURAL WORK OF AMERICAN FICTION,
1790-1860, at xix (1985).
21. Scheckel, supra note 16; Cheyfitz, supra note 16.
22. But see, RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1988).
23. Usually this consists of a summary or introduction of the case, which may reveal the
final holding. Then, a statement of facts, procedural history, statement of applicable law,
[Vol. 33
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judge is free to choose what she wants to write within those structural
restraints, as long as her opinion is consistent with the facts and law presented
to her. However, as Indian law practitioners are well aware, the constraints
provided by the facts in the case and legal precedent are not as rigid as one
might believe. 4 Still, few would make the argument that a judge is as free of
constraints as a novelist when she sits down to write.25
However, novelists are also constrained by the historical precedents to their
work. In other words, novelists are well aware of the history of the novel and
of the basic structural elements of that genre that distinguish it from poetry, for
example. Although early fictional works by Daniel Defoe and others
employed an episodic structure, 6 later works incorporated the familiar
narrative arc common to novels today: readers expect, and typically discover,
a clear beginning, rising action, conflict(s), climax, denouement, and
conclusion. Novels that reject or challenge this structure exist, of course, but
one might argue that their self-conscious rejection of this pattern only proves
its dominance.2z
As William Charvat has argued, novels do not exist in isolation: each novel
is subject to a network of relationships between author, publisher, and reader.2 8
To a greater or lesser extent, each novelist writes with an awareness of his or
her audience and with an awareness of the publisher as a conduit to that
audience. While authors can and often do reject the business side of
publication, in the case of James Fenimore Cooper it is widely acknowledged
he wrote The Pioneers in a last-ditch effort to make money and save the family
land after the death of his father.2 9 Thus, in writing The Pioneers, Cooper
analysis and conclusion or holding. While not all opinions follow this format, most fall within
some variant of it.
24. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (basing the
holding on legal defenses-laches, acquiescence, and impossibility-not briefed by either side).
25. Because the focus of this article is on a nineteenth century novel, the focus of the law
and literature discussion will also be limited to novels, though certainly short stories and other
fiction styles are not exempt from the study of law and literature. Interestingly, however, many
law and literature articles are about novels. This may be due to their length and structure.
26. See, e.g., DANIEL DEFOE, MOLL FLANDERS (G.A. Starr ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1722).
27. See, e.g., ITALO CALVINO, IF ON A WINTER'S NIGHT A TRAVELER (William Weaver
trans., Minerva Press, 1979) (which self-consciously toys with the reader's desire for beginning,
middle, and end through a series of"incipits'"-sections of novels that abruptly end, usually at
the "good part").
28. WILLIAM CHARVAT, THE PROFESSION OF AUTHORSHIP IN AMERICA, 1800-1870
(Matthew J. Bruccoli ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1992).
29. THOMAS HALLOCK, FROM THE FALLEN TREE: FRONTIERNARRATIVES, ENVIRONMENTAL
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undoubtedly hoped to produce a commercially successful novel that, as
Charvat and others have noted, conformed to the expectations of the audience
and provided something new and entertaining for public consumption.3 °
Thus, both law and literature, in the form of legal opinions and novels, are
constrained by audience expectations in equal and opposite directions: both
rely on precedent and novelty. Legal opinions and novels draw on the formats
and even content established by previous texts, but each promise to contribute
something new. The conflict between precedent and novelty is echoed in the
emphasis on argument essential to both genres. As Professor Dolin writes,
One of the movement's pioneers, James Boyd White has argued
through a series of books that law is primarily a language, an
interpretative and rhetorical enterprise like literature. Through the
rhetorical analysis of literary, legal, historical and philosophic texts,
he aims to demonstrate that the writing and reading inherent in the
law in a democracy constitutes a 'culture of argument' a
community open to the voice of the 'other' as well as its
powerful.3'
Thus, both law and literature provide a platform on which such conflicts can
be staged: the opposing sides in a legal case find their counterpart in the
protagonist and antagonist of a novel. In the end, however, the judge finds for
either the plaintiff or the defendant; the novel, too, requires resolution.
As Robert Cover and Robin West have noted, the relative impact of these
resolutions is very different.32 Cover and West claim that not only is law
certainly not literature, it is also dangerous to consider it as such.33 Kieran
Dolin explains:
In the midst of this interdisciplinary endeavour, one irreducible
difference between law and literature has often been reasserted: that
legal interpretation cannot be assimilated to literary interpretation,
because the production and reception of texts within the law takes
POLITICS, AND THE ROOTS OF A NATIONAL PASTORAL, 1749-1826, at 200 (2003) ("During the
period in which The Pioneers was written, a series of lawsuits devoured William Cooper's
claims.").
30. CHARVAT, supra note 28.
31. KIERAN DOLN, FICTION AND THE LAW: LEGAL DISCOURSE IN VICTORIAN AND
MODERNIST LrrERATURE 8 (1999).
32. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (196); West, Adjudication
Is Not Interpretation, supra note 9.
33. Cover, supra note 32, at 1601; West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation, supra note 9,
at 205.
[Vol. 33
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place within a context of the systemic application of state-
sanctioned force.34
Certainly the opinion of Johnson has had lasting and negative consequences
on the legal rights of tribes and tribal citizens. But the story Justice Marshall
chose to tell with his holding is also harmful-both as law and as cultural
understanding. James Fenimore Cooper's novel popularizes Marshall's story
by encoding it within a novel, a work of popular fiction that purports to present
national history,3'5 which was and is readily available to a wide audience.
Cooper's audience has dwindled, but the cultural work performed by his
novels and by Marshall's opinion survives in the legal struggles of indigenous
peoples and in public opinion or ignorance of those struggles. The lack of
attention to the intersections of law and literature compound this problem and,
ironically, may be attributed to the privileged status of each field. Until
recently, law and literature were each associated with an elite cadre of white
males and tended to reinforce the values of that group. 36 Thus, looking at
Bleak House for an understanding of Charles Dickens's view of the law of
Chancery and the lawyers who work there37 or The Portrait of a Lady for
Henry James's view of divorce31 is one aspect of the field. However, law and
literature are well suited to the study of law from other perspectives.
Literature has the ability to reflect many voices in ways the law cannot. As
Edward Said has controversially argued, Jane Austen's Mansfield Park
portrays the legacy of the slave trade in Fanny Price's ill-timed question to her
uncle, an interpretation adopted and reinforced by Patricia Rozema's 1999 film
34. DOLIN, supra note 31, at 10.
35. COOPER, supra note 3, at 16 ("Only forty years have passed since this territory was a
wilderness."). Cooper also includes a footnote in the 1832 edition saying that "[tihe book was
written in 1821-1822." Id. Clearly Cooper is anxious that the reader correctly date the events
in the narrative and locate them within American history.
36. West, Literary Lawyer, supra note 7, at 1197. ("Outsider's voices have historically been
censored from the language of literature and high culture at least as relentlessly as they have
been banned from the language and courts of law. Supplementing one with the other might
leave both bigger and richer, but supplementation alone will not leave either law or literature
more inclusionary."). Of course, this article focuses on a piece of fiction that is certainly
literature which is part of the canon. This goes, however, to the analysis of Cooper's fiction and
its impact on his readers, the dominant white culture. Questioning the canon also has value as
questioning the law-both seem inviolable, but both are incomplete.
37. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES OFLAW & LITERATURE 68
(1992).
38. Melissa J. Ganz, 'A Strange Opposition': The Portrait of a Lady and the Divorce
Debates, 27 HENRY JAMES REv. 156 (2006).
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version of the novel.39 Or more recently, scholars have considered the ways in
which Louise Erdrich demonstrates the effects of allotment on Indian people
in her novels.4"
In other words, feminist scholars, critical race theorists, and others4'
concerned about the impact of the dominant narrative of law on women and
other minority groups when accepted unquestioningly as truth started using
literary theory to study the writings of outgroup members and how they
perceived the law or legal system. 42 Law and literature studies thus become
about "narrative legal scholarship" '3 or the study of indigenous literary
narratives.'
For example, Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg identify ten common
claims of "narrative legal scholarship," '5 including that "stories most often
repressed may be those reflecting the perspectives of subordinated groups" and
that "inclusion of narratives, whether fictional or factual, in legal scholarship
can morally improve the law ... and advance the interests of subordinated
groups." '6 Bruce Duthu also argues for the importance of reading indigenous
"literary narratives" next to cases of federal Indian law to create a more
"polyphonic expression of human life."'7
Incorporating indigenous texts is vital to the study of federal Indian law,
inserting the necessary counterbalance to the majority's law-making
39. Edward W. Said, Jane Austen and Empire, in RAYMOND WILLIAMS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 150 (Terry Eagleton ed., 1989).
40. Kristen A. Carpenter, Contextualizing the Losses ofAllotment Through Literature, 82
N.D. L. REV. 605 (2006).
41. DOIN,supra note 31, at 8 ("Within literary studies, the significance of the legal context
has been closely studied by feminist and postcolonial as well as new historicist critics. The
value of such approaches for this study of fictional representations of law is that they produce
a sharpened awareness of the dialectical relationship between novelistic and other signifying
practices, or in the words of the new historicist Stephen Greenblatt, of 'the forms of power and
the power of forms. .... ').
42. West, Literary Lawyer, supra note 7, at 1202 ("[T]he twentieth century 'law and
literature scholars' engaged in the Critical Project are far more inclined to 'use' literature in
such a way as to call into question the law's moral authority. The critical law and literature
scholar uses literature as a means to open law to criticism, rather than to shield it from criticism
within the protective shroud of high culture, and to push for greater democratization, rather than
greater elitism, in legal processes.").
43. GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 201 (2000).
44. Duthu, supra note 11, at 144.
45. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 43, at 201.
46. Id.
47. Duthu, supra note 11, at 144.
[Vol. 33
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narrative." In addition, however, it is necessary to point out and question the
racist language used in the narratives of majority literature and law.49 In the
case of Johnson v M'Intosh, Justice Marshall's story becomes the stock story
for future legal opinions as Cooper's representation of Templeton becomes
conflated with the history of New York state. ° Countering these stories is a
way to work toward Duthu's goal of "decolonizing federal Indian law [which]
can only proceed if interpreters of legal texts develop a consciousness about
these narrative constructs in order to generate effective strategies to limit, if
not totally eliminate, their tendency to suppress the expression of tribalism."'"
The study of law and literature via narrative legal scholarship, then,
concerns itself with the law in literature. It sometimes includes the law as
literature and the inclusion of non-majority legal narratives into scholarship.
A subset of law and literature not often addressed is that of legal fictions. In
his book Legal Fictions,2 Lon Fuller defines and attempts to categorize legal
fictions. He defines legal fictions as "(1) a statement propounded with a
complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement
recognized as having utility," 3 in other words, a statement that the judge
knows is false and uses it as such.
Legal fictions are a type of storytelling where the fiction is created to make
a smooth rule of law. By acknowledging the fiction, but accepting its basis,
the fiction becomes rule of law and justifies the actions taken by the court. But
48. West, Literary Lawyer, supra note 7, at 1197.
49. Id. at 1199 ("To understand what laws need to be changed, overruled, cast out, or
uprooted, we need to understand, foremost, their political impact, not their cultural heritage.
We need to know who is hurt, and by how much, by the effect of law on the lives of its subjects.
Such an inquiry is not analytically incompatible with a humanistic study of law's promise, and
of its cultural heritage, but it is most assuredly different. There is a difference, and an important
one, between a conception of law as a branch of humanities, and therefore something to
preserve as well as improve upon, and a conception of law as a branch of politics, and therefore
something to use, reform, change, or challenge toward the end of improving people's lives...
. The invitation to read law as literature, and to read literature as a part of law, does sometimes
enlighten, and can itself be an important engine for reform: it alerts us, minimally, to alternative
ways of reading and using extant legal authority. Where the needed reform 'goes to the root,'
however, it can also distract us from the task at hand.").
50. COOPER, supra note 3, at 9. Thus, in his 1832 preface, Cooper feels compelled to
differentiate between facts and fiction: "In order to prevent mistake, it may be well to say that
the incidents of this tale are purely a fiction. The literal facts are chiefly connected with the
natural and artificial objects, and the customs of the inhabitants." Id.
51. Duthu, supra note 11, at 184-85.
52. FULLER, supra note 14.
53. Id. at 9.
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this storytelling only works for those who are in the system-indeed, legal
fictions are not necessarily written for a broad audience the way literature is,
but for a narrow, legal audience. Since legal fictions are only understood by
those within the legal community, they may become "truth" to the majority
society and trickery to the minority group. Certainly their existence
delegitimizes the law in the eyes of outsiders.
Thus, legal fictions represent a difficult concept to counter. They are
created by ajudge for convenience, to ensure the continued smooth application
of the "rule of law." Those trained in law are supposed to be able to understand
the falsity. Studying legal fictions is distinct from studying law as literature.
A focus on legal fictions does not assume law is literature with its attendant
concerns about the power of the law. 4 Rather, questioning legal fictions
allows scholars to question assumptions made by judges and others trained in
the law and the impact of those assumptions on outgroups. The study of legal
fictions also uncovers cases when a legal fiction is no longer considered a
fiction, even by those in the know, and traces the impact of this slippage.
I. Johnson v. M'Intosh: Legal Fictions, Historical "Facts"
and Property Law
Johnson v. M'Intosh55 is the first of the cases known as the Marshall
Trilogy,56 the basis of federal Indian law. Thus, Johnson is often the first case
for students in federal Indian law class. However, recent arguments in Indian
law claim that the "Marshall trilogy has fallen on hard times" '57 and that it has
become less and less relevant as the Supreme Court ignores the cases.5
Johnson, in particular, though, has reach outside of federal Indian law. The
case is still taught in first-year property classes, often as the first case. 9
54. But see Soifer, supra note *, at 882-83 ("Legal fictions are quite different from real,
literary fictions. For one thing, as Bob Cover pointed out, potential violence lurks beneath the
fictions created by judges, while the nexus between even the most powerful literary fiction and
actual force is quite attenuated. Additionally, the author of real fiction enjoys more freedom
than the creator of legal fiction.").
55. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
56. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627,
627 n.2 (2006) (citing CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW:
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 24 (1987)). The other two
cases in the trilogy are Cherokee Nation v. United States, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
57. Fletcher, supra note 56, at 647.
58. Id.
59. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCHILL,
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Therefore, Johnson is unique in the trilogy, as it forms the initial, and perhaps
only, exposure law students have to federal Indian law.
Johnson holds that Indian tribes have a "right of occupancy" 60 to their land
and that tribes can only alienate that land to the United States and not any
other sovereign (or individual).6' Chief Justice John Marshall created this
chain of title by adopting the doctrine of discovery into federal common law.61
Justice Marshall used the doctrine of discovery in this decision to justify the
role of the U.S. federal government vis-a-vis tribes. The discovery and
conquest doctrine claims the first European sovereign to "discover" land holds
the right to the title to the land and the right to conquer those who live there.
However, Marshall also wrote pages of dicta justifying the decisions that make
up the bulk of the opinion. This portion of the opinion is Marshall's "story,"
a narrative written solely to justify his finding; the story has little to do with
the holding or with the facts of the case. Distinguishing between legal fictions,
fictions, and bad facts requires a parsing of the opinion.
As has been well documented by Professor Lindsay Robertson, the history
behind Johnson challenges the modem understanding of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 63 The history of Johnson is a history of legal fictions. The case
itself is a fabrication, constructed by one group of landowners. 6' Professor
Robertson's book charts this fiction and provides a character study of Robert
Goodloe Harper, the former congressman and attorney 5 who painstakingly
attempted every avenue to have the purchases made by the Illinois and Wabash
Land Companies from the Piankashaw and Illinois tribes recognized by the
newly created federal government.6 6 When congressional action failed to
accomplish his goal, Harper worked to have Indiana recognized as a state so
PROPERTY 3 (6th ed. 2006); JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
3 (4th ed. 2006); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY JR., MODERN PROPERTY LAW 2 (6th ed.
2007). Two other property books include the case within the first two chapters, THOMAS W.
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 110 (2007), and SHELDON F.
KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 70 (5th ed. 2007). Stuart Banner
also points out the prominence of Johnson v. M'Intosh in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra, in STUART
BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 11 (2005). However, while he argues the case
in the book is criticized by professors as "anti-canon," only Singer's book actually does so.
60. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585.
61. Id.
62. Fletcher, supra note 56, at 631.
63. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: How THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005).
64. Id. at 47 (Illinois and Wabash Land Companies).
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id. at 32-36.
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that a judicial claim could be heard by the Supreme Court.67  Harper
"construct[ed] the suit," picking both the plaintiff and defendant to ensure
diversity between parties and enough controversy to receive a hearing.6"
Initially the case was brought under an easily identifiable legal fiction
adapted from English courts. In a case to determine title to land, the plaintiff
needed to initiate ejectment proceedings regardless of the actual existence of
a trespasser. To do so, he used a fictitious tenant and fictitious trespasser. As
Professor Robertson writes, the pleadings in district court were
formulaic, literally copied from form books . . . . Ejectment
pleadings were formulaic because they were built on legal fictions:
after the lands had been described, the plaintiff established
jurisdiction by alleging that his tenant, who in fact did not exist,
had been driven by force of arms ("vi et armis") from the disputed
lands by the defendant's tenant, the "casual ejector," who also did
not exist.69
To further illustrate this point, the casual ejector was named "Thomas
Troublesome" and the tenant "Simeon Peaceable."70 The legal fiction of
ejectment is easily recognizable and is the exact type used as an example by
those writing about the place of legal fictions in the law seventy years after the
case was decided.7'
However, when scholars refer to the legal fiction of Johnson v. M'Intosh,
they usually are not referring to the type of case brought. Indeed, sometimes
it is unclear whether they are referring to the holding or the dicta or both.72
67. Id at 45-47.
68. Id. at 47.
69. ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 54. This also demonstrates that legal fictions were
certainly acknowledged as such in 1823, Marshall would have been familiar with them, and
probably familiar with the debates between legal commentators such as Bentham and
Blackstone as to their utility. See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEo. L. J. 1435, 1466
(2007).
70. ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 57. The statement of facts in the case was also a fiction,
where Harper "eliminated all of the factual objections ever raised against the claim." Id. at 55.
71. Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental
to Its Growth? 7 HARv. L. REV. 249, 250 (1893).
72. See e.g., William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of
Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9 n.39 (2005) ("the international legal fiction of 'discovery"');
Laura Nader & Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native American
Law, 23 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 13, 19 (1998) ("Nowhere is the legal fiction and ambiguity
more prevalent than in Supreme Court cases concerning Indian sovereignty.... [I]n Johnson
v. M'Intosh, Marshall held that the United States had preeminent sovereignty over its claimed
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This is an interesting question because the term "legal fiction" has clear
requirements, not the least of which is that the judge using the fiction
understands it as such. There is a serious question as to whether Marshall
intended to write a legal fiction or took his holding at face value. It is difficult
to determine whether he was "bamboozled"73 by the myth of the "vanishing
Indian hunter" and used it to justify the more clearly mythical narrative of
conquest or if he understood both the reasoning and the holding as a legal
fiction.
First, we will consider the holding-that the doctrine of discovery
necessarily limits tribal land rights and particularly tribal title to their own
lands. Marshall wrote:
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great
and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this
country. They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it
was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that
discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right
to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people
would allow them to exercise.74
Marshall's opinion broadened the original legal argument to discuss tribal title
to land.75 In fact, the facts stipulated to in the case assumed the tribes owned
the land and had authority to transfer it.76 One explanation was that Marshall
was trying to do too many things with his decision. Professor Robertson
argues Marshall was looking forward to a second case in which he wanted to
hold a certain way77 and thus expanded the decision beyond the legal question
at hand. In fact, Professor Banner demonstrates the doctrine of discovery was
territory by virtue of the doctrine of 'Discovery' and the rights of 'Conquest."'); William D.
Wallace, M'Intosh to Mabo: Sovereignty, Challenges to Sovereignty and Reassertion of
Sovereign Interests, 5 CHI.-KENTJ. INT'L& COMP. L. article 5, at 4 (2005), http://www.kentlaw.
edu/jicl/articles/spring2005/s2005_williarnwallace.pdf(stating that Marshall's "extravagant"
claims statement demonstrated Marshall's acknowledgment of the "legal fiction involved in his
decision").
73. Fletcher, supra note 56, at 675.
74. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
75. ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 56 (stating that the purchases were made in violation of
the Proclamation of 1763).
76. Id. at 54-55.
77. Id. at 83-89.
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not considered the "general rule of acquiring Indian lands,""8 but, by the time
of the decision, Marshall's reasoning was not surprising for jurists.79 So the
question becomes whether the holding of the case was intended as a legal
fiction or as a "sincere""0 justification for clear title.8"
Certainly, adopting the doctrine of discovery to justify land title fits some
of the key requirements of a legal fiction. The discussion of legal fictions that
use historic doctrines to justify new law is particularly apt to this case. As
Fuller notes, "A judge may state new law in the guise of the old, not for the
purpose of deceiving others, but because this form of statement satisfies his
own longing for a feeling of conservatism and certainty." 2 In addition, Fuller
observes a solution to a case may involve a forcing of the case into existing
categories instead of the creation of a new doctrine. 3 While the doctrine of
discovery was new to federal common law, the doctrine itself had its roots in
the Crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries' and was continued and
revised by Spain and Portugal through the 1400s. 5 The relatively new
situation of determining title passed by tribes to individuals versus title passed
by tribes to nations was not easily resolvable. The old doctrine of discovery
was an existing category, whether it was the way a land tenure system had
actually been operating at the time of the case or not.
The doctrine and its holding also has utility, eliminating questions about
how land can be passed from tribes to sovereigns, limiting tribes ability to
make alliances with other sovereigns on the continent who remained a threat
to the United States, and limiting direct individual involvement with tribal land
purchases. Indeed, Justice Story later wrote that the doctrine "was a 'most
flexible and convenient principle."'8 6 However, whether it was understood to
be a "fiction" by other judges and lawyers at the time is questionable.87
Marshall himself wrote in the opinion that the doctrine of discovery was an
78. Fletcher, supra note 56, at 633.
79. BANNER, supra note 59, at 183.
80. Id.
81. Indeed, legal fictions are often both intended as a fiction and as a justification, which
is discussed infra.
82. FULLER, supra note 14, at 58.
83. Id. at 68.
84. ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS
JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK AND MANIFEST DESTINY 12 (2006).
85. Id. at 13.
86. MILLER, supra note 84, at 11 (quoting The History and Influence of the Puritans, in
THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 459 (William W. Story ed., 1852)).
87. BANNER, supra note 59, at 179-88.
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"extravagant . . . pretension" and that "[h]owever this restriction may be
opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be
indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled ... it
may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by
Courts of justice."8 This "extravagant" claim against "natural law" seems to
demonstrate at least an ambiguous stance on the part of Marshall.
However, the fiction of the doctrine of discovery and conquest became fact
troublesomely fast.8 9 By 1833, Justice Story wrote that "title was founded on
the right of discovery, a right, which was held among the European nations a
just and sufficient foundation, on which to rest their respective claims to the
American continent."" As Fuller writes, a legal fiction "taken seriously, i.e.
'believed,' becomes dangerous and loses its utility."9' However, in this case,
the holding in Johnson continues in its danger, but also in its utility. The
doctrine of discovery, perhaps a legal fiction at the time of its introduction into
the federal common law, lost its fictional qualities quickly and became
"history." As Professor Soifer writes, "We employ legal fictions to preserve
a notion of continuity with the past, yet legal fictions help short-circuit
attempts to comprehend the complexity behind the assumptions a legal fiction
conveys. Like sunlight, legal fictions affect how growth will tilt."92
While the holding has had the most impact on tribal land rights, Marshall's
extensive dicta played into the narrative of Indians, tribes, and removal on a
broader cultural level. As Professor Banner notes, Marshall wrote his history
and dicta portion of the case in eleven days, based primarily on flawed
material.93 Marshall's discovery justification for his holding leads directly to
Justice Reed's infamous statement about what "[e]very American schoolboy
knows." 94 Justice Reed cited to Johnson and the doctrine of discovery, which
by 1955 had become a "legal theory," that "discovery and conquest gave the
88. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823).
89. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 59, at 164-65 (using congressional debate over the 1796
Trade and Intercourse Act to demonstrate a change in understanding of tribal title).
90. Fletcher, supra note 56, at 634 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2, 4 (1833)).
91. FULLER, supra note 14, at 9-10.
92. Soifer, supra note *, at 877.
93. BANNER, supra note 59, at 183-84.
94. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289 (1955) ("Every American
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges
by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets,
food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.").
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conquerors sovereignty over and ownership of the lands thus obtained."95 The
fiction of conquest continued its utility for the Supreme Court, even while all
pretense of its fictional qualities in Marshall's writing was eliminated.
However, Marshall's dicta and reasoning, at the time, also fits Fuller's
definitions of emotive or persuasive96 and apologetic97 legal fictions. An
"emotive fiction" is one that "seems to be intended rather to induce conviction
that a given legal result is just and proper,"' while an apologetic fiction
"apologizes for the necessity in which the law finds itself of attributing to the
acts of parties legal consequences that they could not even remotely have
anticipated."99 In his initial history, Marshall focuses on grants from the
various European crowns to the "discoverers" as evidence of a grant of the
actual land.l"' However, if this were the case, then the question remains why
colonists still purchased land from the tribes and why the foreign governments
entered into treaties. Professor Banner argues that "actual colonial land policy
looked very different from the charters" and "contradicted" them.'0 ' Banner
goes on to argue, however, that Marshall believed the charters were not a
"legal fiction."' 0 2 However, Marshall was a land speculator and knew the
tribes initially sold land to individuals and colonial governments, contrary to
the charters. 10 3 Marshall's distinction between title and occupancy is a fiction
created by him" and successfully made transfers of land from a tribe to
anyone other than a sovereign less than whole. Tribal right of occupancy is an
emotive fiction, helping to "induce conviction" that the legal result here, title
by discovery, is proper.'0 5
In Marshall's other dicta he wrote an apologetic fiction: "Although we do
not mean to engage in the defence of those principles which Europeans have
applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if not
95. Id. at 279. Other authors have drawn connections between these two cases. See also
Ball, supra note 12, at 2298-99; Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal
Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 1215, 1220-23 (1980); SINGER, supra note 59, at 19.
96. FULLER, supra note 14, at 54.
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id. at 54.
99. Id. at 84.
100. BANNER, supra note 59, at 183-84.
101. Id. at 79.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 181.
104. Id. at 29.
105. Id. at 181 ("To arrive at the conclusion that the Indians had merely a right of
occupancy, Marshall pulled together several strands of early nineteenth-century legal thought,
some old and some of relatively recent invention.").
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justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been
wrested from them."" Marshall's contradiction here of not engaging in a
defense but rather a justification also illustrates his problem with the initial
holding. Judicially "conquering" tribes by taking title to their land requires
more than just a single statement. It requires a palliative, an emotive fiction
to smooth over the decision. Therefore, the tribal people must be "fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the
country a wilderness.... ."07 They were also no longer even on the land in
question because, "[a]s the white population advanced, that of the Indians
necessarily receded.... The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests,
and the Indians followed. "The soil, to which the crown originally claimed
title, being no longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants, was parcelled out
according to the will of the sovereign power. ,,1"8 Even assuming these
facts were true, and they are assuredly not,'O° it is a fiction to "attribute [it] to
the acts [of hunting of the parties] legal consequences that they could not even
remotely have anticipated [loss of land and destruction of culture].""
III. Implications of Johnson's Fictions Today
While the Marshall trilogy is less persuasive than it once was, Johnson has
another life outside of Indian law-in first-year property classes, a requirement
of most law schools. Marshall's use of legal fictions is usually glossed over;
instead, the case is used to demonstrate the clear title for all land in the United
States. It is important to note that even if the doctrine of discovery and
Marshall's holding were recognized as legal fictions, they would still harm
because they would retain utility. Indeed, the land title system in the United
States is unlikely to be overturned in recognition that the Johnson holding was
a legal fiction. But if it is recognized as such, it leaves room for other
understandings of land takings. If Fuller's statement that "[a] fiction becomes
wholly safe only when it is used with a complete consciousness of its
falsity""' is true, then understanding Johnson as reality and not a falsity is the
106. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
107. Id. at 590-91.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 59, at 187 (noting that Marshall's account was a "wildly
inaccurate account of colonial land acquisition"); Fletcher, supra note 56, at 675 (examples of
tribal agriculture).
110. FULLER, supra note 14, at 84.
111. Id. at 10.
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danger. Seen as the historic truth, Johnson bars alternate histories. Seeing
Johnson as a legal fiction used by a judge in 1823 renders it less powerful-a
product of its time to be countered rather than the "true" history.
As Johnson depends on one's perception of the case, the manner in which
popular textbooks treat the case is illuminating. Of five property case books
surveyed, 12 none of them refers to the holding of Johnson as a legal fiction,
although one questions the reality of conquest in questions after the case." 3
That book, Joseph Singer's Property Law, is unique in its discussion of tribes
and land ownership. In addition to Johnson, Singer includes Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States"4 and directly connects current Indian land claims and
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation' to the legacy of conquest. 16
Other texts, however, do not include the same level of discussion. One uses
Marshall's history and reasoning as an "explanation" for why the "common
law system and its attendant concept of landownership c[a]me to supplant
preexisting North American property regimes," with no further discussion of
the troubling aspects of Johnson.117 Only one places Johnson within the
Marshall Trilogy,"' and three have notes discussing the "outmoded" principles
of "conquest and discovery."1' 9  Dukeminier's Property gives students
interested in learning more about "the legal situation of Native Americans" a
footnote to Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, making it the
only casebook to reference the Handbook. 20 However, Dukeminier's book
also states "our concern here is not the complexities of title to land once
occupied exclusively by Native Americans. We are interested instead in
getting a study of property underway., 12' Dukeminier relegates tribal title to
land as too complex and no longer important while at the same time implying
that the land is no longer occupied by tribes in one sentence.
112. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 59; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59; KURTZ &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 59; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 59; SINGER, supra note 59.
113. SINGER, supra note 59, at 13 ("Had the Piankeshaw and Illinois Indian Nations been
conquered? When did that happen?").
114. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
115. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
116. SINGER, supra note 59, at 22.
117. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 59, at 2.
118. KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, at 79-80.
119. Id. at 85; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59, at 11-12; MERRILL & SMITH,
supra note 59, at 118-19. However, this book quotes Marshall's language about "fierce
savages" who left the country "a wilderness" and claims these concepts have only "recently
been called into question." Id.
120. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59, at 11 n. 1.
121. Id. at 9.
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With the exception of Singer's book, and indeed, his first chapter is a mini-
history of tribes and tribal land claims, the property case books lack context.
Students of Singer's book would at least be minimally aware of the false
history of conquest. Rather than countering the understanding that tribes were
"conquered" in the first place, the other books are more concerned about
whether "conquest" is a valid way of assuming title. The books point out that
"conquest" is no longer allowed by international treaties, and therefore, is "of
little importance today."' 22 Left standing, however, is the notion that conquest
was what happened to tribes at the time, with little or no discussion of treaties
and the fact that most land which was once tribal land was purchased by the
government through those treaties. Indeed, these modem property books leave
the impression that, although it was unfortunate, tribes were conquered by the
United States, and therefore, white property owners were and are the title
holders to the land. Is "conquest" then truly considered a "legal fiction"? Has
the legal fiction of conquest become historical fact in the minds of lawyers
whose first-year property law course provides their only exposure to Johnson
v. M'Intosh? It seems likely that it has, but certainly Marshall's rather
complicated opinion would not have the resonance it has today if it were not
enforcing a larger majority cultural understanding of the "history" of tribes and
land in the United States.
IV. The Pioneers: Memoir as Fiction
The origins of this cultural narrative can also be located in a contemporary
work of fiction. Published in the same year as Marshall's opinion, The
Pioneers is James Fenimore Cooper's third novel and his second commercial
success.'23 The popularity of The Pioneers has been attributed to Cooper's
depiction of the American landscape"' and the exclusively "American"
characters who inhabit that landscape, particularly the frontiersman, Natty
Bumppo, and the noble Indian, Chingachgook. Although Cooper draws on the
tradition of historical romance popularized by Sir Walter Scott, his attention
122. Id. at 14; see also KuRTZ&HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, at 85 ("Acquisition of title by
conquest generally is prohibited by a number of international treaties.").
123. COOPER, supra note 3, at vii ("His first book, Precaution (1820), had been a weak
imitation of British manners fiction; his second, The Spy (1821) a very successful romance of
the American revolution. The Pioneers, his third, was Cooper's attempt to repeat his success
with another novel based on American materials and depicting American life.").
124. See, e.g., Thomas Gladsky, The Beau Ideal and Cooper's The Pioneers, 20 STUD. IN
THE NOVEL 43 (1988); COOPER, supra note 3, at vii.
HeinOnline  -- 33 Am. Indian L. Rev. 95 2008-2009
96 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
to American characters, landscape, and history provided a "usable past" for the
fledgling American nation.
25
In particular, Cooper attempts to resolve competing claims to the post-
Revolution American landscape through a complicated series of legal fictions
intended to placate white landowners. It is worth noting that Cooper's novel
appears only a few years before the Indian Removal Acts of the 1830s;126
Cooper's Chingachgook is typical of representations of Native Americans in
the novels of this period. As others have noted,'27 the "vanishing Indian" motif
erases white guilt over Indian removal. However, less attention has been paid
to the connections between Cooper's novel and the legal decisions that enabled
Indian removal. Dolin explains: "[F]ictional narrative functions in the public
sphere, contesting or supporting the dominant legal ideology. Central to [t]his
methodology... is a dialectical understanding that novels can represent legal
and alternative world-views and that the law itself can structure those literary
representations.' ' 128 Thus the ongoing debates over Indian removal inform
Cooper's novel, which in turn informs the popular perception of Indians and
their legal and political fate.
The plot of The Pioneers can be summarized as follows: a mysterious
young hunter introduced as Oliver Edwards arrives in the community of
Templeton, located in upstate New York. He lodges with a frontiersman,
Natty Bumppo, and the "last Mohican," Chingachgook. Out hunting one day,
he is accidentally shot by the town founder and leader, Judge Marmaduke
Temple, who has just returned to town with his daughter, Bess. Oliver
reluctantly agrees to reside with the Temples and work as Judge Temple's
assistant, although he is inexplicably resentful of the Judge. Romance
blossoms between himself and Bess Temple, although their social position
appears profoundly unequal. Various catastrophes occur, but at the end of the
novel the reader discovers that Oliver is the grandson of the original owner of
the land on which Templeton sits, the British aristocrat and army officer Major
Effmgham, whose son befriended Marmaduke Temple. Moreover, we
discover that although the Effmghams received the patent from the British
Crown, Chingachgook also granted Major Effingham the same tract of land in
125. VAN WYCK BROOKS, AMERICA'S COMING OF AGE (1915) (first instance of the concept
of a "usable past").
126. DAvID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F.WILKINSoN & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 125-26 (5th ed. 2005).
127. See, e.g., BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTrITUDES AND U.S.
INDIAN PoucY (1982).
128. DOLIN, supra note 31, at 3.
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return for saving his life. The Effinghams remained loyal to the crown during
the American Revolution and thus lost their title at the end of the war.
Marmaduke Temple purchased the land at auction and started the settlement,
but he claims that he has secretly held it in trust for the Effinghams. Natty
Bumppo is discovered to be the loyal servant of Major Effingham, and we
learn that he tended Major Effingham in his illness and attempted to protect his
land. At the conclusion of the novel, Major Effingham and Chingachgook die,
Natty heads west, and Oliver and Bess marry, thus uniting the two remaining
claims to the land. The book has a similar land title structure to that in
question in Johnson: one chain from the crown and one directly from the tribe.
Only by combining the two, title to land and title to occupance, is full title
achieved.
Although this plot summary emphasizes the fictionality of Cooper's text,
Cooper's readers understood the novel as memoir. In the 1832 preface to the
novel, Cooper draws connections between his father's settlement of
Cooperstown and Judge Temple's of Templeton. Cooper later claimed The
Pioneers was not based on the reality of Cooperstown and Judge Cooper, but
he initially promoted this understanding of his book and, from comments in
the 1832 and 1851 prefaces, it seems clear that Cooper's reading audience
made such connections. More recently, many literary critics have accepted
The Pioneers as closer to biography than to fiction.'29 While not at the level
of a Supreme Court decision, if the contemporary readers of The Pioneers
understood the novel as what we would now call a memoir, the stereotypical
characters and vanishing Indian plot become more "true" to the reading
audience. Thus, Cooper's novel straddles the worlds of fiction and memoir
with the expectation that readers of the text would understand the novel in this
same double sense and that doing so would gratify their expectations.
The "double meaning" provided by Cooper's combination of fiction and
memoir is particularly evident in his portrayal of Judge Temple. Not only does
a discussion of Judge Temple provide a place to discuss land in The Pioneers,
a topic vital to the book and the Johnson opinion, he was also modeled on
Cooper's father, William, founder of Cooperstown, a land speculator, judge,
and congressman. William Cooper's Town" ° provides a detailed account of
William Cooper's life and draws parallels to The Pioneers. The connections
between William Cooper and Judge Temple illustrate how Cooper's novel
129. See, e.g., Michael Clark, Biblical Allusion and William Cooper in James Fenimore
Cooper's The Pioneers, U. DAYTON REv., Summer 1987, at 105.
130. TAYLOR, supra note 6.
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attempts to replicate and naturalize the legal fictions by which his father,
William Cooper, acquired his property.
William Cooper was a land speculator in New York, where "no other New
Yorker had his hands in more frontier land speculations."'' Cooper received
his land either directly from tribes132 or through shady dealings. Those
dealings, particularly the one involving land originally owned by the
speculator Col. George Croghan, made up the bulk of what would become
Cooperstown. 133 Croghan owned most of the land throughout Otsego County,
which he obtained directly from the Iroquois in 1768.13' At that tribal council
meeting, Croghan paid less than one shilling per acre for 245,000 acres of land
that was, by treaty, reserved for the Crown. 135 After his death, the land went
up for auction twenty years later. At the "highly irregular auction' '136 William
Cooper won the patent to the land in Otsego County. The title to the land that
became Cooperstown was thus twice clouded. Cooper's actions in the auction
and throughout his time as a speculator made him a controversial figure. 137 As
Alan Taylor writes:
During the late 1790s Cooper was challenged simultaneously from
within his own party by genteel men who disdained his rough
edges and from without by rural democrats who saw him as a
would-be aristocrat. Only partially successful at genteel
reinvention, he was vulnerable to calumny and ridicule from both
the common and polite. By trying and failing to become a polished
gentleman, Cooper only hastened the collapse of his public
authority. 3 '
William Cooper served in Congress from 1795-96 and 1799-1800. During
his 1795-96 session, he voted on the Intercourse Act. 139 Interestingly, in the
debate over this act, various congressmen put forth their understanding of
tribal title to land. Cooper stood up to say that "the idea advanced by the
gentleman from North Carolina, that Indian nations could not hold the fee of
131. Id. at 113.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 46-47.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 46-47.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id. at4,70.
138. Id. at6.
139. BANNER, supra note 59, at 165.
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the countries they possess, was new" and "contrary to natural justice.' ' 40 Given
the nature of his own title, most of it directly from tribes or private speculators,
if tribes did not have title to the land, his speculations were also in danger.
Indeed, Cooper may have been aware of the similar land situation in Illinois
that was the basis of the Johnson case because, for years prior to the decision,
the land speculators involved tried to get congressional approval for the land
purchases
14 1
Like William Cooper, Judge Temple is obsessed with his own role as a
gentleman. He is also particularly concerned with the enforcement of the rule
of law, but only when it is convenient for him. In other words, Judge Temple
also uses legal fictions to achieve his end results. Judge Temple's largest legal
fiction, of course, concerns land rights. At the conclusion of the novel, Judge
Temple reveals that he has held the Effingham property in trust for Oliver:
"One half of my estates shall be thine as soon as they can be conveyed to thee;
and if what my suspicions tell me, be true, I suppose the other must follow
speedily."'' 42 Although Oliver appears perfectly satisfied with this conclusion,
it is strange that Judge Temple only restores half of the Effingham property,
while reserving the other half for his daughter, Bess. While the Judge has a
clear chain of title to the property, purchased at an auction after the American
Revolution, he also feels a moral obligation to the previous owners, the
Effinghams, who received the property as a land grant from the Crown and
also as a grant from Chingachgook, who, as chief of the Mohicans, was
entitled to make such a grant. "The land was owned by my people: we gave it
to my brother, in council - to the Fire-Eater."'4 3 Natty's reply to
Chingachgook's explanation is telling, "[I]t was a comfortable hunting-ground
then, lad, and would have been so to this day, but for the money of
Marmaduke Temple, and the twisty ways of the law."'"
In other ways as well, James Fenimore Cooper uses the character of Judge
Temple to illustrate the "twisty ways," or fictions, in the rule of law. Cooper
seems to write a book that is at least ambiguous in its stance on the dignity of
rule of law. Given his own father's vulnerability to ridicule as a judge and a
congressman, it is unsurprising Judge Temple is subject to the same. Like
William Cooper, Judge Temple exploits his position as judge on numerous
occasions in the novel. In the first deer hunt, the judge stages a mock trial to
140. Id. at 167.
141. ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 18-23.
142. COOPER, supra note 3, at 443-44.
143. Id. at 291.
144. Id.
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determine which hunter has the right to the deer. After being "out-voted --
over-ruled as we say on the bench""14 by Natty and Oliver, he switches tactics
and offers to pay them for the venison. When Oliver reveals that Judge
Temple's shot has missed the deer and instead wounded him, Judge Temple's
reply is telling: "I here give thee a right to shoot deer, or bears, or anything
thou pleasest in my woods forever. Leatherstocking is the only other man that
I have granted the same privilege to; and the time is coming when it will be of
value. But I buy your deer - here, this bill will pay thee, both for thy shot and
my own." 146 Judge Temple uses his authority as judge and prominent
landowner to essentially bribe Oliver into silence.
Later in the novel, when Judge Temple is absent, a group of lawyers debate
Oliver's case: "I ask you gentleman, supposing this to be the case, whether a
jury wouldn't give what I call handsome damages?" '147 In the discussion that
follows, the lawyers claim that no man is above the law, but they are
eventually silenced by Betty Hollister, who notes that Judge Temple "has a
purse as long as one of them pines on the hill, and who is an asy man to dale
wid, if yees but mind the humour of him."'48 Betty's observation makes it
clear that Judge Temple is not the impartial enforcer of the law he wishes to
appear, but rather a wealthy man able to exert his will without suffering the
consequences. Indeed, Judge Temple places his own cousin, Richard Jones,
in the position of sheriff, which allows him to exert control over both the
apprehension and trial of suspected criminals.
Cooper also illustrates a mixed view of the Western rule of law. As
Elizabeth says to Chingachgook, "[I]f you knew our laws and customs better,
you would judge differently of our acts,"'49 a twofold plea. Certainly the
Indians of that place would ask for the same understanding, rather than be
dismissed as "fierce savages, whose occupation was war."'' °  Cooper's
145. ld. at 24.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 152.
148. Id. at 153.
149. COOPER, supra note 3, at 402. Elizabeth's plea also echos Thomas Jefferson's writing.
See Ball, supra note 12, at 2306 ("In a typically liberal-hearted gesture, Thomas Jefferson
enjoined Indians to enclose lands and take up farming. Once their land became property, he
added, they would then want laws for its protection. Jefferson concluded: 'You will find that
our laws are good for this purpose; you will wish to live under them, you will unite yourselves
with us, join in our great councils and form one people with us, and we shall all be Americans;
you will mix with us by marriage, your blood will run in our veins, and will spread with us over
this great island."')
150. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
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depiction of the rule of law acknowledges, to a limited degree, the legal
fictions necessary to impose the Western rule of law. Indeed, Cooper's law is
twisted, as the judge values the "law" over his daughter and condemns
Bumppo to jail and to pay a fine he cannot pay. The judge, however, gives
money to his daughter to pay Bumppo's fine, creating an obsession with
technicality and with the fiction of an impartial judge. As Judge Temple tells
Bess, "Nothing short of the twelve dollars and a half will satisfy this harpy [the
magistrate], I perceive; and surely my reputation as a Judge is worth that
trifle"'' Although Judge Temple is anxious to be perceived as a fair judge, he
seeks out legal loopholes to satisfy both his sense of natural law and his desire
to uphold the Western rule of law. As Bess tells Oliver, "[M]y father is a
Judge, but he is a man, and a Christian. It is all understood, and no harm shall
follow."'5 And, indeed, in Natty's trial, no real harm does follow. Judge
Temple skillfully manipulates the jury to ensure that it finds as he wishes.'53
Judge Temple's rule of law is as full of twisty dealings as Marshall's opinion.
V Legal Fictions: Johnson v. M'Intosh and The Pioneers
In his oft-anthologized poem "How to Write the Great American Indian
Novel," Sherman Alexie satirizes white stereotypes of Native cultures.
154
Although Alexie is directly borrowing from romance novels, the genealogy of
this stereotype can be traced to Cooper's strong and silent Indians. The
difference is, of course, that Alexie and others can deconstruct such
stereotypes or ignore them by writing compelling Native characters into the
literary canon. Literature forever reinvents itself. The law, however, relies
heavily on the notion of precedent. Justice Marshall's legal fictions are
therefore much more difficult to rewrite or reject. While The Pioneers and
Johnson may have either reinforced existing beliefs or been recognized as
legal fictions at the time of publication, their influence today continues to
reinforce outmoded thoughts-and whether discovery and conquest is a legal
fiction in the minds of most lawyers, nevermind most non-Indian U.S. citizens,
is certainly up for debate.
In his decision, Marshall notes that the conqueror's limits are prescribed by
"public opinion." These limits are that the "conquered shall not be wantonly
oppressed, and that their condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible
151. COOPER, supra note 3, at 330.
152. Id. at 343.
153. Id. at 364, 369-72.
154. SHERMAN ALEXIE, How to Write the Great American Indian Novel, in THE SUMMER
OF BLACK WIDOWS 94-95 (1996).
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with the objects of the conquest." Given the release of The Pioneers in 1823,
its popularity, and Cooper's stated intent to write a "descriptive tale" about the
early American landscape, certainly Cooper's characters and stereotypes help
to create this public opinion. Or, as Cheyfitz claims, "The Pioneers asked and
asks its readers to take this authority [Judge Temple] seriously, just as
seriously as the Johnson case asks its readers to take its authority."'
' 55
In contrast, Thomas Hallock argues that Cooper wrote The Pioneers as a
way to create a new myth about the West, to "explain away a legacy of
conquest."' 56 Hallock claims that whatever Cooper's "faults" were as an
author, he "realized that nations were narrated, that those narratives were
inherently unstable because challenges to authority were endemic to border
society. ..""' Two things of note, the first is that The Pioneers does not
explain away a legacy of conquest. Rather, it reinforces Marshall's use of the
legal fiction of discovery and conquest by presenting it as (albeit fictionalized)
American history. Indeed, Hallock's statement indicates his own belief in the
history of conquest, anathema though he may find it. Second, nation-defining
narratives are only open to challenge by those in power. It is highly unlikely
that an alternative to conquest, say, the history of treaty-making from a tribal
perspective, would have been considered a significant challenge to Cooper's
history, even as he was crafting it.
Instead, popular white writers, including James Fenimore Cooper, Catharine
Maria Sedgwick, Lydia Maria Child, and others,' were crafting a more
insidious and familiar myth: the Vanishing American. In novels published in
the early nineteenth century, these authors repeatedly presented indigenous
characters that willingly leave, die, or disappear from the American landscape.
In Sedgwick's Hope Leslie,'59 the narrator describes the departure of the
Pequod from the colonies as follows:
Before the dawn of the next morning, this little remnant of the
Pequod race, a name at which, but a few years before, all within the
bounds of the New-England colonies -- all, English and Indians,
'grew pale,' began their pilgrimage to the far western forests. That
155. Cheyfitz, supra note 16, at 119.
156. HALLOCK, supra note 29, at 202.
157. Id. at 202.
158. See, e.g., Lora Romero, Vanishing Americans: Gender, Empire, and New Historicism,
63 AM. LITERATURE 385 (1991) (counting over forty novels published between 1824 and 1834
that feature this trope.).
159. CATHARINE MARIA SEDGWICK, HOPE LESLIE (Carolyn Karcher ed., Penguin 1998)
(1827).
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which remains untold of their story, is lost in the deep, voiceless
obscurity of those unknown regions. 0
Similar passages occur in Child's Hobomok,16 1 in which the Indian hero of the
title voluntarily divorces his wife and becomes a wanderer so that she may
marry an earlier, white lover. This pattern is continued in much of Cooper's
work, but especially in The Last of the Mohicans and The Pioneers.
The Last of the Mohicans162 was published in 1826 as a sort of prequel to
The Pioneers; it also is a clear source of inspiration for Sedgwick's Hope
Leslie, published a year later. In the novel, readers are introduced to
Chingachgook's son, Uncas, who falls in love with one of the heroines, Cora,
and dies trying to defend her. As Lora Romero has argued, the novel is full of
"precipitous aboriginal[s]' ' 63 and Uncas's death is presented as the
culmination of a series of Indian deaths. Read in the context of The Pioneers,
however, Uncas's death becomes even more disturbing. Cooper never
mentions Chingachgook's immediate family in The Pioneers and
Chingachgook describes himself as the last of his tribe; thus, readers of The
Last of the Mohicans, published three years after The Pioneers, would already
know that Chingachgook's son, like Chingachgook himself, is doomed to die.
In The Pioneers, Cooper depicts the Vanishing Indian as already the last of
the Mohicans, already the relic of a previous age. Unable and unwilling to
completely assimilate to white culture, Chingachgook is rendered impotent by
age. Cooper initially suggests that Chingachgook's contact with white culture
is responsible for his weakness: "Is John old? When was a Mohican a squaw,
with seventy winters! No! The white man brings old age with him - rum is his
tomahawk! '164 This moment is powerful in its willingness to assign
responsibility to white culture; however, Cooper's later descriptions of
Chingachgook's weakness efface white agency: "But John is old; his hand is
the hand of a squaw; his tomahawk is a hatchet; brooms and baskets are his
enemies - he strikes no other.', 165 In this passage, Cooper describes
Chingachgook as fully domesticated; his tomahawk exchanged for the
domestic implements of hatchet, broom, and basket. Chingachgook will only
160. Id. at 359.
161. LYDIA MARIA CHILD, HOBOMOK AND OTHER WRITINGS ON INDIANS (Carolyn L.
Karcher ed., Rutgers University Press 1995) (1824).
162. JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS (Richard Slotkin ed., Penguin
1986) (1826).
163. Romero, supra note 158, at 392.
164. COOPER, supra note 3, at 185.
165. Id. at 207.
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reject his domesticated position at the end of the novel when he commits
suicide: "John's hand can make baskets no more - he wants no shirt.' 66 As
he prepares for death, Chingachgook appears in full regalia and rejects the
marks of assimilation offered by Bess: he will not trade with her; he will not
accept the shirt she offers, and thus assimilate to the dress of the settlers, but
instead appears bare-chested. Bess's response, "I feel as if you had a natural
right to order what you will from us,' 67 is typical of her heightened awareness
of Chingachgook's plight at the end of the novel; significantly, Bess only
realizes the complexities of her father's title to Templeton when the other
claimants are near death. Thus Cooper, to borrow Duthu's phrasing,
"bloodlessly conquers"' 6 tribes through his stand-in, Chingachook, who nobly
kills himself, relieving the whites (and particularly Elizabeth) from having to
scrutinize the basis of their land holdings.
Chingachgook's mysterious pronouncements about Oliver's land rights are
explained by Oliver at the conclusion of the novel, thus resolving the last
obstacle to clear title: "[Natty] was left here as a kind of locum tenens on the
lands that old Mohegan (whose life my grandfather once saved) induced the
Delawares to grant to him, when they admitted him as an honorary member of
their tribe. ' 69 Oliver's declaration redefines Natty's identity as well as his
own: Natty is not an aging but independent hunter, instead he is the faithful
servant of a British aristocrat; Oliver is not Chingachgook's blood relative, but
an adopted member of his tribe. These revelations disenfranchise Natty while
paving the way for Oliver's enfranchisement: without any "Indian blood," and
with a conveniently aristocratic pedigree, Oliver Edwards Effingham may
inherit his father's property and marry Bess, the heiress of the remainder of
Templeton according to Western law.
Within Cooper's novel, Marshall's concern with the "actual state of
things"17 is echoed in Bess's discussion of the land she inherits. In a
conversation with Edwards, Bess states she "grieve[s] when [she] see[s] old
Mohegan walking about these lands . . .and feel[s] how small" her own
"right" is to possess the lands. 7 ' What is to be done, however? If she and her
father "offer[ed] the old man a home and maintenance, his habits would
compel him to refuse us," and certainly she would never be so foolish as to
166. Id. at 400.
167. Id.
168. Duthu, supra note 11, at 184.
169. COOPER, supra note 3, at 441.
170. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823).
171. COOPER, supra note 3, at 280.
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"convert these clearings and farms, again, into hunting grounds," assuming,
of course, what the old man wants is "hunting grounds" in the first place.
For Cooper, as for Marshall, the settlement cannot be returned to native
tribes because it has already been settled. In fact, in the passage above, Bess
describes Chingachgook as "the ghost of one of [the land's] ancient
possessors." '172 For Cooper's characters and Marshall, settlement is necessarily
an improvement that cannot and should not be undone. Both contribute to the
legacy of the fiction of impossibility, a fiction harming tribes and tribal people
to this day. 73 Believing it "impossible" to return the land to the Indians for
various reasons (racism, settlement, manifest destiny), both needed a
justification for keeping the land. Indeed the legal basis for the title to the land
Cooper was writing about is based entirely on the vanishing Indian, and
Cooper's representation of the vanishing Indian both satisfies any lingering
anxiety over the white settlers' title to the land and works to prevent anxiety
over the upcoming Indian Removal Acts.
Cooper illustrates the impossibility of returning the land to "hunting
grounds" by imposing the rule of law over the hunting of deer. Indeed, the
introductory scene and the main conflict in the book center around the date on
which a deer is killed. Imposing the rle of law over hunting is the same thing
as imposing the rule of law on the Native himself. In yet another example of
the vanishing Indian, banning hunting, so closely tied to the lone Indian
representative in the book, is essentially banning the Indian from the land.
Although The Pioneers predates the Indian Removal Acts of the 1830s, it
performed a kind of cultural work by enabling readers to believe that the
172. Id.
173. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 219-20 (2005). In this tax case
the Supreme Court held that the doctrines of laches, acquiescence and impossibility prevented
the Oneida Indian Nation from exercising sovereignty over its own lands. In particular, the
impossibility doctrine is based on the fact that the land around the Oneida Nation's land is now
owned by non-Indians, thus making it "impossible" for the tribe to exercise sovereignty. The
Court's citations and quotes regarding impossibility sound remarkably like those expressed by
Elizabeth and Justice Marshall: "Finally, this Court has recognized the impracticability of
returning to Indian control land that generations earlier passed into numerous private hands."
Id.; see Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357 (1926) ("It is impossible..
. to rescind the cession and restore the Indians to their former rights because the lands have been
opened to settlement and large portions of them are now in the possession of innumerable
innocent purchasers ...."); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 334 (1892) (observing, in declining
to award equitable relief, "[t]hat which was wild land thirty years ago is now intersected by
streets, subdivided into blocks and lots, and largely occupied by persons who have bought upon
the strength of Patrick's title, and have erected buildings of a permanent character").; see
Kathryn E. Fort, The (In)Equities of Federal Indian Law, FED. LAW, Mar./Apr. 2007, at 32.
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Indian removal had already happened.174 This kind of cultural work is
particularly dangerous, as it creates a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. Readers
who believed that Indian removal had already occurred based on the repeated
representation of vanishing Indians in popular fiction did not object to the
legal procedures that enacted the "real" removal. As Thomas Hallock
observes, "Critics of romantic literature note that elegies for the vanished race
were a shorthand for dispossession."1" Thus it is unsurprising to find Marshall
borrowing from and contributing to this series of representations in his opinion
and to find similar representations in Andrew Jackson's speeches in support
of Indian removal. 
176
The confluence of The Pioneers and Johnson certainly demonstrates how
law and literature equally influence the public, and especially the educated,
white, male public. These fictions, then, become the legal loophole,
particularly in Johnson, that allows the Court to remove title from the
indigenous peoples. While Marshall was writing as a nineteenth-century white
man, and thus had certain understandings of people who were not white or
male, he nonetheless broadened his holding in Johnson to include any number
of legal fictions to bolster his point. As Professor Robertson writes,
For the present, Marshall had no interest in considering alternatives
to his history. His aim was to present evidence in support of his
principal conclusions, which were that 'all the nations of Europe,
who have acquired territory on this continent, have asserted in
themselves, and have recognized in others, the exclusive right of
the discoverer to appropriate lands occupied by Indians,' and that
the sovereigns of Europe had granted lands still in possession of
Indians.'
174. Cf Scheckel, supra note 16, at 145 ("Describing the dispossession of the Indians in
terms of generational change erased both violence and responsibility from the process.").
Scheckel focuses on mourning the generational passing to make removal easier for whites.
175. HALLOCK, supra note 29, at 198.
176. Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1021 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897), available at
http://gutenberg.org/dirs/1/0/8/5/10858/10858.txt ("Our ancestors found them the uncontrolled
possessors of these vast regions. By persuasion and force they have been made to retire from
river to river and from mountain to mountain, until some of the tribes have become extinct and
others have left but remnants to preserve for awhile their once terrible names."); Andrew
Jackson, Second Annual Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PREsIDENTs,supra, at 1063-92, available at http://gutenberg.org/dirs/1/0/8/5/10858/10858.txt.
177. ROBERTSON, supra note 63, at 103.
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Thus, the problem with Marshall's writing goes beyond what we see today as
racist ramblings about the role of Indians and their land. The isste with
Marshall's legal fictions was that there were other histories to consider and
that he knew what they were. They included the fact that many land
transactions were just that-transactions of title, not by conquest or discovery,
but by contract. We see Marshall's discomfort with this fiction in the opinion
itself: "Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be,
respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully
asserted."' 78 Despite his "private and speculative opinions," however, the
holding stands; the rule of law prevails.
Cooper presages Jackson's famous, apocryphal line regarding a later
Marshall decision when Natty says that Judge Temple "may sintence, but he
can't keep"'179 Natty in his prison. President Jackson, of course, supposedly
stated that "Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it," regarding
Worchester v. Georgia.180 These descriptions belie the "rule of law," precious
as precedent to lawyers and judges, making "law" convenient for majority
culture. Not only is the law based on racist understandings of indigenous
peoples, but it also is applied selectively. In this way, it is important to note
that Cooper only critiques the rule of law as it applies to Natty Bumppo, a
character sympathetic to indigenous rights but entirely white. Natty, not
Chingachgook, is the victim of Temple's hunting regulations, and Natty is
tried and condemned for this violation of the law. Thus, while Cooper is
willing to acknowledge that Western rule of law is far from perfect, he is not
willing to examine the direct impact of rule of law on indigenous peoples.
Indeed, instead of directly confronting white usurpation of Native lands,
Cooper creates an extensive legal fiction to justify Temple's claim to the land
and insists that Chingachgook support such a claim.
Two other scholars have analyzed The Pioneers and Johnson v. M'Intosh,
one from a literature perspective 8' and one from an Indian studies
perspective.' 82 Both serve as a foundation for our argument. However, most
analysis of Cooper is not under the rubric of law and literature, and of those
readings that did consider the role of law in Cooper's fiction, the standard
178. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
179. COOPER, supra note 3, at 389.
180. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 126, at 122 (includes a discussion of the sources of the
likely apocryphal statement).
181. Scheckel,supra note 16.
182. Cheyfitz, supra note 16.
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reading of The Pioneers has focused on the struggle between Natty Bumppo's
"natural law" and the victory of rule of law. 18 3 Although this critique, like
Cooper's novel, acknowledges the appeal of Natty's "natural law," it also
confirms the necessary imposition of the rule of law on the wilderness. Thus,
this type of literary critique, in its mere existence, continues to reinforce
Cooper's stereotypes, leaving the "frontier" as an empty, lawless place."8
Moreover, the frontier is ever receding. At the conclusion of the novel, as
Natty heads west, Cooper and his readers are well aware that he is "foremost
in that band of Pioneers, who are opening the way for the march of the nation
across the continent"' 85 and thus destroying his own way of life.
Conclusion
The "twisty ways of the law" are prevalent both in Cooper's novel and in
Marshall's opinion; in both texts, these "twisty ways" take the form of legal
fictions. Marshall's fiction continues to haunt Indian law today, much like
Cooper's fiction continues to provide stock characters for literature. Marshall's
"right of occupancy," "title by conquest," and "actual state of things" can be
as difficult to accept (or should not be accepted) in Indian law as Cooper's
"happy hunting grounds," the vanishing Indian, and actual state of things.
Marshall's fictions, however, have been more difficult to counter in U.S. laws
and courts than Cooper's have been in literature. This, of course, is because
Marshall's fictions are cloaked in the authority of law, while Cooper's can be
dismissed as fiction.
Yet, as we have argued, The Pioneers was not solely understood as fiction:
Cooper's readers read it as both fiction and memoir, and thus its representation
of Judge Temple as a noble but flawed arbiter is also a representation of
Cooper's father. Cooper grapples with his own past, but his novel represents
that past as necessary to the national future: this fictionalized past lays the
groundwork for the Western rule of law. Judge Temple is succeeded by Bess
and Oliver, who more successfully negotiate the compromises between civil
and natural law, free of the difficult presence of indigenous peoples.
Yet, although the novel concludes with the wedding of Bess and Oliver, it
also concludes with two funerals: the burial of Chingachgook and Major
Effingham. Elizabeth and Oliver read the tombstones to Natty, who
183. See Kelly Stem, Cooper's The Pioneers, 55 EXPLICATOR 208,208-12 (1997); Scheckel,
supra note 16.
184. See Brook Thomas, The Pioneers, or Sources ofAmerican Legal History: A Critical
Tale 36 AM. Q. 86 (1984); Cheyfitz, supra note 16, at 119.
185. COOPER, supra note 3, at 456.
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catches-of all things-a spelling error: Chingachgook's name is misspelled.
Oliver promises to correct the inscription, but this scene underscores the
failure of white culture to "write" the Indian. In contrast with Chingachgook's
death-marked by a thunderbolt, no less-Elizabeth and Oliver's misspelled
tombstone, with its backhanded platitudes about Chingachgook's worth,
reveals the failure of white narrative and the danger of inscribing such
narratives in stone or in law.
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